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ABSTRACT
We survey search-theoretic models of the labor market and discuss their usefulness for analyzing
labor market dynamics, job turnover, and wages. We first examine single-agent models, showing
how they can incorporate many interesting features and generate rich predictions. We then consider
equilibrium models that endogenize several variables that are treated parametrically in single-agent
models, including the arrival rate of job offers and the wage distribution. We survey alternative
formulations of these models, emphasizing two key issues: how workers and firms meet, and how
wages are determined. We emphasize throughout the implications of alternative assumptions for
turnover, wage dispersion, and efficiency.
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1 Introduction
The economic fortunes of most individuals are largely determined by their la-
bor market experiences. Hence, economists are naturally interested not only
in documenting and analyzing the empirical behavior of wages and employ-
ment, but also in building models within which we can study labor market
outcomes from both a positive and a normative perspective, and within which
we can assess the consequences of changes in labor market policies, regula-
tions and institutions. While the usual paradigm of supply and demand
in a frictionless labor market is useful for discussing some of the questions,
important phenomena not easily addressed in this setup include labor mar-
ket transitions, such as movements between employment and unemployment,
and the distribution of wages across individuals and over time.
Since its inception search theory has been extremely useful for thinking
about these things, and for addressing a host of related empirical and policy
issues. Even the earliest models that study a single agent in isolation enhance
our understanding and our ability to organize observations about the work
histories of individuals. But more recently, equilibrium search theory has
embedded these agents into models that endogenously determine important
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1variables like job creation and destruction rates and the wage distribution.
The goal of this survey is to summarize these eﬀorts, and in the process
to provide a unifying perspective within which the various models can be
seen. Throughout the presentation we will emphasize three things that search
theory helps us understand: job creation, job destruction, and wages.
The kinds of questions that we will be concerned with include the fol-
lowing. What economic factors determine labor market transitions, and in
particular what determines the equilibrium unemployment rate? Why do
unemployed agents sometimes choose to remain unemployed, say by turn-
ing down oﬀers, and more generally what determines the length of unem-
ployment spells? How can ostensibly homogeneous workers end up with
diﬀerent wages? What are the trade-oﬀs faced by ﬁrms when they pay dif-
ferent wages? What are the interactions between wages and turnover? And
what determines the eﬃcient amount of turnover? This essay shows that
search theory provides a rigorous yet tractable framework that can be used
to address these questions, and thereby provides important insights into the
functioning of modern labor markets.
At the outset, it is important to point out that search theory constitutes
a very large branch of economics. In addition to labor it has been used in
many applications in both micro and macro, including monetary theory, in-
dustrial organization, ﬁnance, and the economics of the marriage market, all
of which we must neglect lest this survey becomes unmanageable.1 Search
has been used in technical theoretical work, and has been a workhorse for
empirical economics, but we can neither delve into pure theory nor pay ap-
propriate attention to all of the econometric issues or empirical results here.2
Also, while the analysis will strive to be rigorous, we want to emphasize
applications and issues–that is, what can we learn about labor economics
from these models–and not models or methods per se. Hence the presenta-
tion will revolve around the ways in which the models help us think about
1Examples in monetary economics include Kiyotaki-Wright (1993), Shi (1995) and
Trejos-Wright (1995); examples in the marriage literature include Mortensen (1988),
Burdett-Coles (1997, 1999) and Shimer-Smith (2000); examples in IO include Salop (1977),
Jovanovic (1982), Jovanovic-MacDonald (1994), and Jovanovic-Rob (1989); examples in
ﬁnance include Duﬃe-Garleanu-Pedersen (2002) and Weill (2003).
2Examples of theoretical work studying the question of whether frictionless competitive
equilibrium can be considered the limit of search equilibrium as the frictions get small
include Rubinstein-Wolinsky (1987), Gale (1987) and Mortensen-Wright (2002). Devine-
Kiefer (1991) and Wolpin (1995) provide surveys of empirical applications.
2substantive issues related to turnover and wages.
The essay proceeds as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we study the problem
of a single agent, not only because this is the way the literature began but
because it is an important component of the equilibrium models that follow.
In Section 4 we consider models that build upon two main ingredients: the
matching function, which determines how workers and ﬁrms get together, and
the bargaining solution, which determines the wage once they do. In Section
5 we study a class of models where wages are posted ex ante, rather than
bargained after workers and ﬁrms meet, and where agents use directed rather
than random search. In Section 6 we discuss models with nontransferable
utility, where the focus is on determining which matches get consummated.
In Section 7 we present models where wages are posted ex ante but search is
once again random, with an emphasis on wage dispersion. In Section 8 we
discusses eﬃciency.
Although the diﬀerent versions of the model that we present sometimes
adopt some very diﬀerent assumptions–e.g. random versus directed search,
transferrable versus nontransferable utility, bargaining versus wage posting,
and so on–we want to emphasize that they are really diﬀerent applications
of the same framework, and in each case the analysis uses the same set of
basic tools. Our goal is that, with a little work, the reader should feel at
t h ee n do ft h i sa r t i c l et h a ts e a r c ht h e o r yi saﬂexible and broadly applicable
paradigm for organizing our thinking about labor markets, and that this will
stimulate even more learning and research in the area.3
2 A Simple Model
We begin with the problem of an individual searching for a job in real time,
taking market conditions as given.4 He seeks to maximize E
P∞
t=0 β
txt,w h e r e
3Earlier surveys include Lippman-McCall (1976a), Mortensen (1986) and Mortensen-
Pissarides (1999a,b). Naturally there is some overlap with the current essay, although our
approach and many of the issues we address are diﬀerent. Examples of things emphsized
here and not in those papers include the directed search models in Section 5, the non-
transferable utility models in Section 6, some of the wage dispersion models in Section 7,
and aspects of our approach to eﬃciency in Section 8.
4While it is often said that the economics of search began with Stigler (1961), his
formulation was not really dynamic. McCall (1970), Mortensen (1970) and Gronau (1971)
presented the ﬁrst sequential models of job search, although others had posed related
problems (including Simon 1955, who discussed looking for a house).
3β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, xt is income at t,a n dE denotes the expec-
tation. Income is x = w if employed at wage w and x = b if unemployed.
Although we refer to w as the wage, more generally it could capture some
measure of the desirability of the job, depending on things like beneﬁts, lo-
cation, prestige, etc. (see Hwang-Mortensen-Reed 1998). Similarly, although
we will refer to b>0 as unemployment insurance (UI), it can also include
the value of leisure or home production.5
The individual chooses a policy for whether to accept a job. We begin
with the case where an unemployed individual samples one i.i.d. oﬀer each
period from a known distribution with CDF F(w).I f a n o ﬀer is rejected
the agent remains unemployed that period. Previously rejected oﬀers cannot
be recalled, although this assumption is not restrictive because the problem
is stationary, so that an oﬀe rt h a ti sn o ta c c e p t a b l et o d a yw i l ln o tb ea c -
ceptable tomorrow. For now we assume that if a job is accepted the worker
keeps it forever. Hence, W(w)=w/(1 − β) is the payoﬀ to accepting (W
stands for the value of working). Similarly, U = b + βEmax{W(w0),U},
where the expectation is with respect to the next oﬀer w0,i st h ep a y o ﬀ from
rejecting, earning b, waiting and sampling again (U stands for the value of
unemployment).
Let the value of having an oﬀer w in hand be








Since W(w) is increasing, there is a unique wR called the reservation wage
such that W(wR)=U, with the property that the agent should reject w<w R
and accept w>w R. Clearly, wR =( 1 −β)b+(1−β)βEO(w0), which expresses
wR in terms of the unknown function O. To eliminate O, insert b+βEO(w0)=
wR/(1 − β) into (1) and integrate to get EO(w0)=Emax{w0,w R}/(1 − β);
then we have




5We formulate the problem as though the agent is interested in maximizing expected
discounted income. This is the same as maximizing expected utility if the worker is risk
neutral, of course, but also if he is risk averse and markets are complete, since then he can
maximize utility by ﬁrst maximizing income and then smoothing consumption. The case
of a risk averse agent facing incomplete markets is more diﬃcult. Early analyses include
Danforth (1979) and Hall-Lippman-McCall (1979); more recent studies include Valdivia
(1997), Costain (1997), Browning-Crossley-Smith (1999) and Lenz-Tranaes (2003).
4The function T is easily shown to be a contraction. Hence, there is a unique
solution to wR = T(wR), and the sequence wN+1 = T(wN) converges to wR
as N →∞starting from any initial value of w0.6
Once we know wR we know everything there is to know about the optimal
strategy. However, we also present some alternative representations often
seen in the literature. First, subtracting βwR from both sides of (2) and
simplifying, we get the usual reservation wage equation





(w − wR)dF(w), (3)
which equates the utility per period from accepting wR to the payoﬀ from
rejecting, which is b plus the expected improvement next period. Using
integration by parts, we can also write





[1 − F(w)]dw, (4)
which is quite handy in some of the applications below.7
A unifying theme of our essay is that search theory allows us to discuss
issues neglected by traditional (supply and demand) theories of labor mar-
kets. Even this extremely basic model can be used to illustrate the point.
The probability the worker gets a job each period, called the hazard rate,
is H =1 − F(wR), so the probability of being unemployed t periods is









Also, the observed distribution of wages paid is G(w)=F(w|w ≥ wR).
C o n s i d e rt h ei m p a c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nb–say, more generous UI–which
is an experiment we will come back to repeatedly. From the reservation wage
equation the immediate eﬀect is to increase wR, which has two secondary
6Here wN can be interpreted as the reservation wage from a ﬁnite-horizon search prob-
lem with N periods remaining, if we start at w0 = b,s i n c eb is the reservation wage
for a one-shot problem. One can check that wN converges monotonically to wR;i . e .t h e
ﬁnite-horizon reservation wage increases as the horizon gets longer.
7To derive (4), note that for any distribution with upper bound ¯ w,
R ¯ w
wR(w−wR)dF(w)=





5eﬀects: the distribution of observed wages G(w) is higher in the sense of ﬁrst
order stochastic dominance, since more low wage oﬀers are rejected; and the
hazard rate H is lower, increasing average unemployment duration. We will
extend things in many ways in what follows, but this simple example shows
how search-based models are well designed for discussing unemployment and
wages.8
3 Extensions
Although the above model permits a rudimentary discussion of unemploy-
ment duration and the wage distribution, it is inadequate along several di-
mensions. For example, since workers receive 1 oﬀer per period, a change b
aﬀects things only through the reservation wage and not the oﬀer arrival rate.
Also it does not allow us to discuss the duration of employment, since by as-
sumption jobs last forever. Here we consider some extensions to remedy this.
These extensions, including search intensity, on-the-job search, wage changes
and learning, are important ingredients into equilibrium models of the type
discussed in later sections.
3.1 Search Intensity
As a ﬁrst step, consider a worker who receives n oﬀers per period where
n is a Poisson random variable with parameter α; i.e. the probability of
n ∈ {0,1,2,...} is αne−α/n!. If a worker receives multiple oﬀers, he either
accepts the best, which is a random variable with CDF F(w)n, or rejects
them all and continues searching. The logic used to derive (3) now implies











8Other results from this model that are not easy to discuss using supply and demand
include the eﬀects of changes in F. For some of these experiments it is useful to assume
F is log-concave (i.e. logF is concave), which as ﬁrst pointed out by Burdett (1981) is
often useful in search theory. As an example, suppose we increase wages, in the sense of
increasing every w in the support of F either by a constant or proportionally. Then perhaps
surprisingly, one can show that E[w|w ≥ wR] may go down, but it can be guaranteed to
go up under log-concavity (Wright-Loberg 1987 show this under the interpretation that
the changes in w are due to tax changes).
6For some applications it is useful to consider the case where the length of
a time period is very short. Thus, let ∆ denote the period length and write
β = 1
1+r∆.T h en u m b e ro fo ﬀers per period is now Poisson with parameter
α∆, and (6) becomes











Taking the limit as ∆ → 0 gives





(w − wR)dF(w), (8)
s i n c ea l lt e r m si nt h es u m m a t i o ne x c e p tt h eﬁrst are of order ∆2, and hence
become negligible when ∆ is small. This is the continuous-time version of
reservation wage equation (3); the continuous-time version of (4) follows from
again integrating by parts.9
We now allow workers to choose their search intensity, making α endoge-
nous. Assume that the (utility) cost of achieving arrival rate α is g(α),w h e r e
g0 > 0 and g00 > 0.U n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r sc h o o s eα to maximize the value of
unemployed search, rU = wR,w h e r en o w





(w − wR)dF(w). (9)
The ﬁrst order condition for α (assuming an interior solution, which we can





From (9) and (10), an increase in b raises wR and reduces α.T h u se n d o g e -
nous intensity introduces a new channel through which things like b inﬂu-
ence the outcome. Notice that here the hazard is H = α[1 − F(wR)],a n dt h e
probability of ﬁnding a job after an unemployment spell of length t is He−Ht.
Hence, the average duration of unemployment is D =
R ∞
0 tHe−Htdt =1 /H,
t h es a m ea s( 5 ) . 10
9When ∆ is small, the time until the arrival of the next oﬀer is an exponential random
variable t with distribution 1 − e−αt. This implies the expected time until the next oﬀer
is 1/α, independent of history. We say this arrival process is memoryless.
10As a exercise, one can show ∂H/∂α > 0 if F is log-concave, but not in general (see
Flinn-Heckman 1983 or Burdett-Ondrich 1985).
73.2 Turnover
S of a rw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a to n c ea no ﬀer is accepted it is permanent. Sadly,
perhaps, not all relationships last forever, so here we add the possibility that
jobs end. Returning to the case of exogenous search intensity for now, sup-
pose layoﬀs arrive according to a Poisson process with parameter λ.W e
endogenize this in various ways below, but for now λ is constant.11 Also,
because it will be useful for some applications, we introduce the possibility
that the individual may die or otherwise permanently exit the market ac-
cording to an independent Poisson process with parameter δ,a f t e rw h i c hh e
gets utility normalized to 0.
Let the period length be ∆, the discount factor 1
1+r∆, the probability of
an oﬀer α∆, the probability of a layoﬀ λ∆, and the probability of death δ∆
per period (we implicitly ignore the possibility of multiple events within a
period, and assume that ∆ is suﬃciently short so that all these probabilities
a r el e s st h a n1 ) .B e l l m a n ’ se q u a t i o n sa r e













[λ∆U +( 1− λ∆)W(w)]. (12)
Taking limits as ∆ → 0 gives
(r + δ)U = b + α
Z ∞
0
max{W(w) − U,0}dF(w) (13)
(r + δ)W(w)=w + λ[U − W(w)]. (14)
Again, the reservation wage satisﬁes W(wR)=U, and the methods lead-
ing to (4) now yield
wR = b +
α
r + δ + λ
Z ∞
wR
[1 − F(w)]dw. (15)
Notice λ and δ aﬀect wR only by changing the eﬀective discount rate to
r + λ + δ, but they also aﬀect labor market transitions directly. Thus, the
worker now goes through repeated spells of employment and unemployment,
11It is also interesting to let λ vary across jobs, since then a reservation strategy needs
to be deﬁned in terms of the pair (w,λ) (Burdett-Mortensen 1980; Wright 1987).
8a n di fh es t a r t su n e m p l o y e d ,o na v e r a g eh es pe n d saf r a c t i o n(λ+δ)/(H+λ+δ)
of his life unemployed. The model can be used for organizing micro data
on individual wage and employment histories. But although it generates
turnover, this model does so only through exogenous events like layoﬀsa n d
deaths. We next consider extensions that endogenize job separations.
3.2.1 On-the-job Search
In reality much turnover is accounted for by job-to-job transitions with no in-
tervening period of unemployment. The on-the-job search model of Burdett
(1978) allows for this, and in addition explains how tenure at a particular job
is correlated with other variables, such as the wage and quit rate. Following
the presentation in Mortensen and Neumann (1984), suppose new oﬀers ar-
rive in continuous time at rate α0 while unemployed and α1 while employed.
Each oﬀe ri sar a n d o md r a wf r o mt h es a m eF. For now, search intensity and
hence α0 and α1 are exogenous. Also, to reduce notation, for the rest of this
section we set δ =0 . The strategy of an employed worker is obvious: accept
any oﬀer greater than your current wage. What needs to be determined is
the strategy of an unemployed worker.
The methods leading to (13) and (14) now imply
rU = b + α0
Z ∞
wR






0)+λ[U − W(w)], (17)
where the second term in (17) represents the event that an outside oﬀer
arrives while employed. Evaluating (17) at w = wR and combining it with
(16),






Observe that wR i sg r e a t e ro rl e s st h a nb as α0 is greater or less than α1.
Thus, when oﬀers arrive more frequently while employed, individuals may
accept w<b , just to get other oﬀers.
To eliminate W from (18), integrate by parts and insert W0(w)={r +
λ + α1[1 − F(w)]}−1,w h i c hw eg e tb yd i ﬀerentiating (17), to yield




1 − F (w)
r + λ + α1[1 − F (w)]
¸
dw. (19)
9This is a generalized version of (4), which was the special case α1 =0 .T h e
basic results are similar to those in the simpler model, including ∂wR/∂b > 0,
but now we have interesting new predictions. For instance, when wR is higher
workers do not accept low wage jobs, and so are less likely to experience job-
to-job transitions. In other words, an increase in UI reduces turnover. The
model is also obviously consistent with the facts that wages increase with
tenure and turnover decreases with tenure since higher wage workers are less
likely to leave.12
3.2.2 On-the-job Wage Changes
Another factor contributing to turnover is that w may change at a given job.
Suppose that according to a Poisson process with parameter λ, it changes
from w to a new w0 drawn from F(w0|w). Notice the exogenous layoﬀ model
discussed above can be thought of a special case where w0 =0with probabil-
i t y1 ,s ot h a ta tr a t eλ the job eﬀectively disappears. Here, when the wage
changes the worker can stay employed at w0 or quit to unemployment, but
in contrast to the model in the previous section, he cannot reject w0 in favor





0) − W(w),U− W(w)]dF(w
0|w). (20)
If F(w0|w2) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates F(w0|w1) whenever w2 >
w1, W(w) is increasing and there is a single reservation wage wR for employed
and unemployed agents. When employed at w, if the wage falls to w0 <w R
t h ew o r k e rq u i t st ou n e m p l o y m e n t . I ti se a s yt os e et h a tt h eq u i tr a t ei s
decreasing in w. In the simplest case where F(w0|w)=F(w) (independence),
we have





(w − wR)dF(w). (21)
Notice λ>αimplies that individuals accept w<b –they prefer to take a job
paying less than UI and wait for the wage to change rather than continuing
to search while unemployed. An increase in b still raises wR,w h i c hi ng e n e r a l
aﬀects transitions in and out of unemployment.
12To make search intensity endogenous with on-the-job search, let g0(α) denote the cost
of searching with intensity α f o ra nu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e ra n dg1(α) denote the cost for an
employed worker. If g0
0(α) ≤ g0
1(α) for all α, then unemployed workers will always search
harder than employed workers. In any case, workers employed at higher wages search less,
with search intensity declining to zero at very high wages.
103.2.3 On-the-job Learning
Another framework with implications for turnover is the Jovanovic (1979a)
learning model, which can rationalize some of the same observations the on-
the-job search model explains.13 J o v a n o v i cs t u d i e st h ec a s ew h e r ea g e n t s
have to learn in real time about how good they are at any job based on noisy
productivity observations. Here we present the simple version in Wright
(1986), where all learning takes place in one period (see Pries 2004 for an
intermediate case). Assume an oﬀer is a signal ω,w h e r eω is drawn from
H(ω), depending on both the true wage w and some noise; e.g., we could have
ω = zw where z is random. Using Bayes rule, we can back out the posterior
distribution of the wage conditional on the signal, F(w|ω).A s s u m eF(w|ω2)
ﬁrst order stochastically dominates F(w|ω1) whenever ω2 >ω 1.
In discrete time, the value of search is now




The value of employment at a known w is given by
W(w)=w + β max[W(w),U], (23)
since the worker can stay or quit. If he quits, his payoﬀ is U,a s s u m i n gh e
must wait one period for the next oﬀer. Since W(w) is increasing, stochastic
dominance implies E[W(w)|ω] is increasing in ω. Hence there is a reservation
signal ωR such that oﬀers should be accepted if ω ≥ ωR.O n c ew is revealed,
the worker quits if w<w R. Notice that in this model workers may willingly
accept jobs they would prefer to reject if information were perfect, and vice-
versa. Of course these eﬀects are not symmetric: a bad job that is accepted
soon leads to a quit; a good job that is rejected is lost forever.
More general learning models have the implication that reservation signals
increase with tenure. This is because at the beginning of an employment
13See also Wilde (1979) and Jovanovic (1979b). Also, note that the kind of learning we
consider here is distinguished from learning about the distribution F while searching, which
is also interesting; Burdett-Vishwanath (1998a) provide an example and references. It is
worth mentioning that with learning about F, it is not even guaranteed that a reservation
strategy will be optimal. Suppose, e.g., we know either: a) w = w0 with prob 1;o rb )
w = w1 with prob π and w = w2 with prob 1 − π.I f w2 >w 1 >w 0 and π is small, it
can be optimal to accept w0 but not w1 since an oﬀer of w1 signals that there is a good
chance of getting w2. Rothschild (1974) gives conditions to guarantee a reservation policy
is optimal.
11spell there is a lot of uncertainty, so a low value of the signal does not
necessarily imply that things are so bad. Similarly, a good signal is also not
that informative, but since the worker can always quit there is an option value
to staying. The more that is known about a situation, the more demanding
one tends to be. Individuals with a long tenure at a job have already learned
a lot and so they are less likely to quit. Furthermore, given that they are still
there, they are more likely to be earning higher wages. Hence, this model
also predicts quit rates fall and wages rise with tenure.
3.3 Discussion
There are many other interesting applications and generalizations of the ba-
sic model that we do not have space to cover.14 Suﬃce it to say that the
framework would seem to have appeal for both micro and macro economists.
For the former there are explicit predictions about things like individual labor
market histories and wages; for the latter there is a foundation for a model
of the “natural” rate of unemployment and how it is aﬀected by policies such
as changes in UI. Despite this, these models are not fully satisfactory for our
purposes, because they are decision-theoretic (single-agent) models. For the
remainder of the essay we want to move to equilibrium models.
W ee m p h a s i z et h a tt h ei s s u ei sn o tg e n e r a lv e r s u sp a r t i a le q u i l i b r i u mp e r
se. For example, there is not necessarily a problem of internal consistency
with assuming F is given exogenously, as we can simply consider workers
searching for jobs in nature–say, good ﬁshing spots.15 T h em o r ei n t e r e s t i n g
i s s u ei st h a to n em i g h tw a n tt oa l l o wF to change endogenously with changes
in policy, rather than simply assuming it is given by nature. To this extent
we want models where wages are endogenous. Similarly we want models
where the rates at which matches form and break up are endogenous. We
have already discussed how we can make these things depend on workers’
14For example, one can consider more complicated dynamic versions of the problem,
including the case where oﬀers are serially correlated as in Lippman-McCall (1976b),
Jovanovic (1987) and Lippman-Mamer (1989). Or one can study the case where UI varies
over time as in Burdett (1979), Mortensen (1977), Albrecht-Vroman (2000) and Coles-
Masters (2000). Also, there are dynamic extensions such as “systematic search” where you
ﬁrst look at the locations that are best according to a prior, and if those are unsuccessful
you proceed to other locations, typically lowering your reservation wage along the way, as
in Salop (1973).
15This is one interpretation of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), who use a version of the
model described above to discuss macro issues.
12behavior, including endogenous search intensity, on-the-job search, etc., but
it seems clear that ﬁrms’ behavior may also have an impact on them. When
w es a yw ew a n tt om o v et oe q u i l i b r i u mm o d e l s ,w em e a nt h a tw ew a n tt og e t
ﬁrms involved more explicitly.
However, there is no single way to proceed. Any equilibrium search model
is going to require that we confront several issues, including two that we will
emphasize: 1. how do parties meet; and 2. how do they determine wages. We
will consider various assumptions along these lines. Although some people
may prefer a single “one-size-ﬁts-all” model, we think that it is a virtue of the
approach that there are diﬀerent sets of assumptions at our disposal. Given
there is variation in actual wage setting practice, and the process by which
workers and ﬁrms get together, we need to be ﬂexible in our theories, and
we want to understand how variation in assumptions inﬂuences outcomes.
Moreover, all of the models discussed below are really just diﬀerent ways of
embedding workers, each of whom solves some version of the basic search
problem studied above, into an environment where ﬁrms make interesting
decisions.
4 Random Search and Bargaining
This section discusses a prominent line of research emanating from the work
of Pissarides (1985, 2000), that studies underlying determinants of oﬀer ar-
rival rates, match dissolution rates, and wages. We will present a sequence
of models that emphasize diﬀerent margins, including entry by ﬁrms, the
decision to consummate matches, and the decision to terminate matches.
Before we do so, as we just said above, there are two key issues that need
to be addressed: how do workers and ﬁrms meet, and how are wages deter-
mined. This class of models assumes meeting rates are determined through a
matching function and wages through bargaining. We begin with these ideas.
4.1 The Matching Function
Suppose that at some point in time there are v vacancies posted by ﬁrms
looking for workers and u unemployed workers looking for jobs.16 Building
on ideas in Diamond (1981, 1982a,b), Mortensen (1982a,b), Pissarides (1984,
16For now we assume search intensity is ﬁxed, but see Section 8 for a matching function
where it is endogenous.
131985) and elsewhere, we assume the number of contacts between ﬁrms and
workers is given by a matching technology m = m(u,v). This function is
an exogenous speciﬁcation, like a production function. Assuming all workers
are the same and all ﬁrms are the same, the arrival rates for unemployed








It is standard to assume the function m is continuous, non-negative, in-
creasing in both arguments and concave, with m(u,0) = m(0,v)=0for
all (u,v). I nd i s c r e t e - t i m em o d e l sw ea l s oa s s u m em(u,v) ≤ min{u,v}.
It is also convenient to assume m displays constant returns to scale, i.e.
χm(u,v)=m(χu,χv). While alternative assumptions are interesting–e.g.
increasing returns potentially generates multiple equilibria, as emphasized by
Diamond–constant returns is not inconsistent with the empirical work going
back to Pissarides (1986) and Blanchard-Diamond (1989) (see the survey by
Petrongolo-Pissarides 2001). Also, in our context, constant returns generates
a big increase in tractability. In particular, it implies that αw and αe depend
only on the ratio v/u, often referred to as a measure of market tightness,
where αw is an increasing and αe ad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fv/u.E q u i v a l e n t l y ,
there is a continuous, decreasing, and 1-to-1 mapping between αw and αe,
which will be very useful below.
The meeting technology is meant to represent in a simple if somewhat
reduced-form fashion the notion that it takes time for workers and ﬁrms to
get together. Just as a production function maps labor and capital into out-
put, m maps search by workers and ﬁrms into meetings. There are papers
that model this more deeply, some of which we discuss below. But start-
ing with an exogenous matching function allows us to be agnostic about
the actual mechanics of the process by which agents meet. An advantage
of this approach is that it is a ﬂexible way to incorporate features that
seem desirable–e.g. more search by either side of the market yields more
meetings–and one can regard the exact speciﬁcation as an empirical issue.
This may make matching a bit of a black box, but it has proved to be a very
useful approach.17
17We do want to mention an interesting alternative to the speciﬁcation in the text, where
the number of meetings depends on the ﬂows of new unmatched workers and ﬁrms rather
than the stocks of existing unemployment and vacancies; see Coles-Smith (1996,1998). See
Lagos (2000) for another alternative approach.
144.2 Bargaining
Now we consider the situation of a worker and a ﬁrm who have met and have
an opportunity to produce a ﬂow of output y. Suppose that if the worker
gets w, his expected lifetime utility is W(w) while the ﬁrm earns expected
discounted proﬁt J(π),w h e r eπ = y − w (again W stands for the value of
working, and now J stands for the value to the ﬁrm of a job that is ﬁlled).
If they fail to reach agreement, the worker’s payoﬀ falls to U and the ﬁrm’s
to V (again U stands for the value of unemployment, and now V stands
for the value to the ﬁrm of a vacancy). We will soon determine U and V
endogenously, but for now take them as given. We are of course interested
in situations where W(w) >Uand J(y − w) >V for some w, so that there
is something to bargain over.
A standard approach is to assume that the wage is determined by the
generalized Nash bargaining solution with threat points U and V ,
w =a r gm a x[ W(w) − U]
θ[J(y − w) − V ]
1−θ, (25)
where θ ∈ (0,1) is the worker’s bargaining power. The solution to the maxi-
mization problem satisﬁes
θ[J(y − w) − V ]W
0(w)=( 1− θ)[W(w) − U]J
0(y − w), (26)
which can be solved for w. Since it is an important building block in this
class of models, and since wage determination is one of the key themes of this
essay, we think that it is important to discuss the Nash bargaining solution
carefully.
Nash (1950) did not actually analyze the bargaining process, but took as
given four simple axioms and showed that his solution is the unique outcome
satisfying these axioms.18 The solution, while elegant and practical, is again
a bit of a black box. However, as is well known, one can provide a game-
theoretic description of the bargaining process along the lines of Rubinstein
(1982) that has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that approximates the
Nash solution. That is, as the time between counteroﬀers in the negotiation
game becomes small, the equilibrium outcome converges to that predicted by
18Nash actually showed that the unique outcome consistent with his axioms has θ =1 /2.
Relaxing his symmetry axiom, (25) with any θ ∈ (0,1) satisﬁes the other axioms, and this
is what is called the generalized Nash solution. See Osborne-Rubinstein (1990).
15the Nash solution, for particular choices of the threat points and bargaining
power that depend on the details of the underlying game.19
For instance, suppose that each agent has a given probability of proposing
(as opposed to responding to) an oﬀer in each round of the bargaining game;
other things being equal, this bargaining game generates the same outcome as
the Nash solution in which the bargaining power equals that probability. Of
course, this only pushes θ one level back–where does that probability come
from? In fact the nature of bargaining may well diﬀer across industries,
countries, and so on, and varying θ is one way to try and capture this. Also,
at least in simple models, as we vary θ between 0 and 1 we trace out the
set of bilaterally eﬃcient and incentive compatible employment relationships,
which would seem to cover the cases of interest. So, while Nash bargaining
may not be the last word on wage determination, we think that it has proven
(like the matching technology) to be a useful approach that one ought to
know.
To proceed, suppose as above that workers and ﬁrms are risk-neutral,
inﬁnitely-lived, and discount future payoﬀs in continuous time at rate r,a n d
that matches end exogenously at rate λ.T h e nw eh a v e
rW(w)=w + λ[U − W(w)] (27)
rJ(π)=π + λ[V − J(w)]. (28)
This implies W0(w)=−J0(π)= 1
r+λ. Inserting these into (26) and rearrang-
ing gives
W(w)=U + θ[J(y − w) − V + W(w) − U]. (29)
This says that in terms of total lifetime expected utility, the worker receives
his threat point U plus a share of the surplus,d e ﬁned by
S(y)=J(y − w) − V + W(w) − U. (30)





r+λ where wR and πR are reservation wage and proﬁt levels for
the worker and ﬁrm. Then (25) reduces to
w =a r gm a x[ w − wR]
θ[y − w − πR]
1−θ, (31)
19Again see Osborne-Rubinstein (1990), although note that they only consider station-
ary environments; for the nonstationary case see Coles-Wright (1998).
16which has the solution
w(y)=wR + θ(y − πR − wR). (32)
Hence, in this model the Nash solution also splits the surplus in terms of
the current period utility. Notice that w(y) ≥ wR iﬀ y ≥ yR = πR + wR.
Similarly, π(y)=y−w(y) ≥ πR iﬀ y ≥ yR. This implies the worker and ﬁrm
necessarily agree to consummate a relationship iﬀ y ≥ yR.
4.3 Job Creation
We now combine matching and bargaining in a model where a ﬁrms’ deci-
sion to post a vacancy is endogenized using a free entry condition.20 Let k
be the ﬂow cost of posting a vacancy. Let y be the output of any match.
All matches face an exogenous breakup rate λ. There is a unit mass of ho-
mogeneous workers, and unmatched workers search costlessly, while matched
workers cannot search. We focus here on steady states, and let u and v rep-
resent steady-state levels of unemployment and vacancies. The steady-state
unemployment rate is u = λ/(λ + αw),w h e r eαw = m(u,v)/u and m is the
meeting technology. As discussed above, assuming constant returns, once we
know αw we know αe since both are functions of u/v.
The value of posting a vacancy is
rV = −k + αe[J(π) − V ], (33)
since it costs k a n dt h ej o bi sﬁlled at rate αe. As free entry drives V to 0,
we need not keep track of V , and we can write (33) as
αeJ(π)=k. (34)
Also, the value of unemployment satisﬁes
rU = b + αw[W(w) − U], (35)
while the equations for W and J are unchanged from (27) and (28). Formally,
an equilibrium includes the value functions (J,W,U),t h ew a g ew,a n dt h e
20In this basic version of the model, entry by ﬁrms is (almost) the only endogenous
variable, but in this or any other version one can alternatively assume a ﬁxed number of
ﬁrms, and equilibrium will then determine V endogenously.
17unemployment and vacancy rates (u,v), satisfying Bellman’s equations, the
bargaining solution, free entry and the steady-state condition.21
Next we discuss how to solve the model. One approach would be to try to
ﬁnd the equilibrium wage. Start with some arbitrary w,s o l v e( 2 8 )f o rJ(π),
and then use (34) to solve for αe and αw. This determines W and U.T h i s
w is an equilibrium iﬀ the implied values for J, W and U a r es u c ht h a tt h e
bargaining condition holds. While this works, here we bypass w by working
directly with the surplus S. Substitution of J and W from (27) and (28) into
(30) yields
(r + λ)S(y)=y − rU (36)
N o w( 2 9 )a l l o w su st or e w r i t e( 3 5 )a srU = b + αwθS(y).N o w( 3 6 )g i v e s
(r + λ + αwθ)S(y)=y − b. (37)
The next step generally in this method is to obtain expressions that char-
acterize optimal choices for each of the decisions made outside of a match,
given S. In this particular model the only such decision is whether to
post a vacancy. Using (34) and the fact that bargaining implies J[π(y)] =
(1 − θ)S(y),w eh a v e
k = αe(1 − θ)S(y). (38)
Now (37) and (38) completely characterize equilibrium. In this simple model
we can combine them as






Under standard regularity conditions a unique solution for αw exists. From
this we can recover the wage,
w(y)=y − (r + λ)(1 − θ)S(y). (40)
A number of results now follow easily. For example, an increase in b
reduces the rate at which workers contact ﬁrms αw,r a i s e st h er a t ea tw h i c h
21Although we focus on steady states, dynamics here are straightforward. The key
observation is that the free entry condition pins down αe and therefore αw. Hence, given
any initial unemployment rate, vacancies adjust so that u/v jumps to the steady state
level, which implies all other variables are constant along the path as u and v converge to
their steady state levels. See Mortensen (1989,1999) for models that are related, but have
dynamics that can be much more complicated.
18ﬁrms contact workers αe,r e d u c e sS(y),a n dr a i s e sw(y). The conclusion
that unemployment duration and wages increase with UI is similar to what
we found in the single-agent model with endogenous search intensity, but
the interpretation here is diﬀerent. In that model an increase in b induced
workers to reduce their search intensity and raise their reservation wage. Here
an increase in b raises the bargained wage, which discourages job creation,
thereby increasing unemployment duration.22
In the above model it takes time for workers and ﬁrms to get together,
but every contact leads to a match, and w i st h es a m ei ne v e r ym a t c h .
This seems quite special when compared to the models in Sections 2 and
3, since it corresponds to workers sampling from a degenerate distribution.
Moreover, in applications, changes in the probability that a contact leads
to job creation may be important. Hence we want to generalize things so
t h a tn o te v e r yc o n t a c tr e s u l t si nam a t c ha n dn o te v e r ym a t c hy i e l d st h e
same wage. Thus, assume that when a worker and ﬁrm meet they draw a
match-speciﬁc productivity y from some distribution F, where for simplicity
y is observed by both parties and constant for the duration of the match.
We know from Section 4.2 that workers and ﬁrms agree to match iﬀ y ≥ yR,
where yR will be characterized below.
An equilibrium is described by the same objects as above, except now J,
W,e t c . a r ei n d e x e db yy, plus the new variable yR. Equilibrium will also
determine the distribution of productivity across existing relationships, or
equivalently, given w(y), the wage distribution G(w). The only things that
change from the previous model are Bellman’s equation for an unemployed
worker and the free entry condition, which become
rU = b + αw
Z ∞
yR











To solve this model, combine these to get rU = b + αwθk
αe(1−θ), then substitute
into (36) to get




22One special case merits mention: suppose m(u,v)=µv, so vacancies are the only
input into the matching function. Then an increase in b reduces v/u,w h i c hi n c r e a s e su,
but has no eﬀect on w or workers’ payoﬀs conditional on employment status.
19In particular, yR satisﬁes S(yR)=0 ,o r




Finally, since S0(y)= 1
r+λ, S(y)=( y − yR)/(r + λ) for y>y R,a n d( 4 2 )
can be written
(r + λ)k = αe(1 − θ)
Z ∞
yR
(y − yR)dF(y). (45)
We can now solve for yR and αw from (44) and (45). The ﬁrst of these
equations describes an increasing relationship between αw and yR (when it is
easier for a worker to ﬁnd a job, he is more willing to turn down a potential
match with low productivity). The second gives a decreasing relationship
betweenyR and αw (when yR is higher, meetings are less proﬁtable for ﬁrms so
they post fewer vacancies). There exists a unique equilibrium under standard
conditions. One can now recover the wage function: since w(yR)=yR and
w0(y)=θ if y>y R,w eh a v ew(y)=yR+θ(y−yR). Since the distribution of
match productivity is F(y) truncated at yR, the equilibrium wage distribution
G(w) is given by F(y) and w(y).
It is now easy to discuss turnover and wages. For example, an increase in
b shifts (44) but not (45), resulting in an increase in yR,ar e d u c t i o ni nαw,
and a reduction in H = αw[1 − F(yR)]. From a worker’s perspective, things
here closely resemble the single-agent problem, in the sense that he receives
oﬀers at rate αw from a given distribution and needs to decide which ones
to accept, although of course here the wage distribution and arrival rate are
endogenous. As in the single-agent problem, two things need to happen in
order for a worker to transit from unemployment to employment: he needs
to contact a ﬁrm, and the draw y needs to be good enough.
4.4 Job Destruction
We now endogenize the job destruction rate, following Mortensen-Pissarides
(1994), by incorporating on-the-job wage changes as in Section 3.2.2.23 The
resulting framework is interesting because it captures endogenously both the
ﬂows into and out of unemployment. Given that these ﬂows vary a lot across
23Other extensions from Section 3 can also be added, including on-the-job search (Pis-
sarides 1984,1994) and learning (Pries 2004; Pries-Rogerson 2000).
20countries and over time, it allows one to begin thinking formally about various
factors that can account for these diﬀerences. To proceed, let y be the current
output produced in a match and assume that at rate λ we get a new draw
from F(y0|y),w i t hy0 ∈ [0, ¯ y] for some ¯ y. Also assume F(y0|y2) ﬁrst order
stochastically dominates F(y0|y1) whenever y2 >y 1 to ensure a reservation
strategy. It remains to specify the level of productivity in new matches. One
can assume new matches start at some random y, but here we assume they
b e g i nw i t ht h es a m ey0 (some papers assume y0 =¯ y).
An equilibrium is deﬁned as the natural extension of the previous model,
and we can jump directly to the equation for the surplus






Since rU = b + αwθS(y0),t h i sc a nb er e w r i t t e n






T oc l o s et h em o d e lw ea g a i nu s ef r e ee n t r y ,
k = βαe(1 − θ)S(y0). (48)
Finding equilibrium amounts to solving (48) and (47) for yR and αw.
The argument is slightly more complicated here because we are now look-
ing for a ﬁxed point in a system of functional equations–(47) deﬁnes both
yR and S(y) as functions of αw. Nevertheless, an increase in αw reduces S(y)
for all y and hence raises the reservation wage yR. Thus, (47) describes an in-
creasing relationship between αw and yR,c a l l e dt h ejob destruction curve.A t
t h es a m et i m e ,( 4 8 )i n d i c a t e st h a tw h e nαw is higher S(y0) must be higher,
so from (47) yR must be lower, and this deﬁnes a decreasing relationship
between αw and yR called the job creation curve. The intersection of these
curves gives steady-state equilibrium, which exists uniquely under standard
conditions. See Mortensen-Pissarides (1994, 1999b) for further discussion.
4.5 Extensions and Applications
Cole-Rogerson (1999) discuss how well the model accounts quantitatively for
the behavior of job creation and destruction over the business cycle. Shimer
21(2004) also studies the model quantitatively, pointing out that it predicts rel-
atively small ﬂuctuations in αw in response to reasonably calibrated shocks
to y or λ. Costain-Reiter (2003) argue that if one calibrates to generate re-
alistic business cycle ﬂuctuations in the job-ﬁnding rate, the model predicts
an unrealistically large impact of UI on the job-ﬁnding rate. Hall (2003)
pursues one possible resolution of this puzzle by assuming wages are more
backward looking than Nash bargaining permits. He shows that a modi-
ﬁcation to the wage equation can signiﬁcantly improve the performance of
this model. Other authors who use the framework for business cycle analysis
include Andolfatto (1996), Merz (1995, 1999) and den Haan-Ramey-Watson
(2000).
One issue that has received attention in business cycle versions of these
models is “cleansing”–the notion that in bad economic times low productiv-
ity matches are destroyed, as discussed in Caballero-Hammour (1994,1996).
More recently, Barlevy (2002) argues that recessions are “sullying” rather
than “cleansing” because they inhibit workers’ ability to move up the job
ladder. We alluded earlier to a literature that uses these models to study
t h eb e h a v i o ro fw o r k e ra n dj o bﬂows across countries as well as over the
business cycle. Millard-Mortensen (1997) show how diﬀerent policy regimes
in the US and UK can account for their diﬀerent labor market outcomes.
Delacroix (1999, 2003) and Blanchard-Portugal (2001) study the eﬀect of
various employment protection policies.
There is also a literature that allows heterogeneous workers and ﬁrms.
Acemoglu (1999, 2001) and Albrecht-Vroman (2002) consider workers that
diﬀer in skill and show how this can aﬀect the types of jobs ﬁr m sc r e a t ea n d
the wage and unemployment levels for diﬀerent groups. Mortensen-Pissarides
(1999c) examine how various policies impact diﬀerently across skill groups.
Shimer (1999) considers heterogeneous workers, allows multiple workers to
show up for a given vacancy, and studies how this can aﬀect unemployment
dynamics for low-skill workers. Shimer-Smith (2000) ask whether matching is
assortative in an environment in which workers and ﬁrms are heterogeneous.
W h i l ew ec a n n o td oj u s t i c et oa l lt h ew o r ki nt h ea r e a ,w ew a n tt os a yt h a t
it represents a very active and productive research area.24
24A related literature follows the Lucas-Prescott (1974) approch, which does not use a
matching function (although it could) and assumes wages are determined competitively;
recent examples include Greenwood-MacDonald-Zhang (1996), Gomes-Greenwood-Rebelo
(2001) and Alvarez-Veracierto (1999). Another related model was presented by Howitt
and McAfee (1987) and Howitt (1988).
225 D i r e c t e dS e a r c ha n dP o s t i n g
A key aspect of any decentralized mechanism in an equilibrium search model
is wage determination. In the previous section we studied bargaining, and
here we discuss another possibility: ex ante wage posting. In addition to
posting, the models in the section also adopt the idea of directed search,
which means that agents can, as the name suggests, direct their search eﬀorts
towards particular wages. Following Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996), models
with the combination of posting and directed search are referred to in the
literature since as competitive search models. It is important to emphasize
that it is the combination of these features that is important; in Section 7
we will study posting with random search, which is quite diﬀerent.
The literature has proposed several alternative but equivalent approaches
to competitive search. One approach posits a group of agents called market
makers who publicly set up submarkets with posted wages, with the property
that any match consummated in their submarket must be at the posted wage.
Within each submarket there is still random matching with a constant returns
function m(u,v),s ot h a tq = u/v determines the meeting rates αw and αe
(obviously q is the inverse of market tightness as deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n4 . 1 ) .
Each unemployed worker and each ﬁrm with a vacancy take as given w and
q in every submarket, and go to the one oﬀering the highest expected utility.
In equilibrium, two things are true: q in each submarket must be consistent
with what agents take as given; and no market maker can post w ad i ﬀerent
from what is already posted and attract both workers and employers.25
Another approach supposes that employers themselves post wages, and
unemployed workers direct their search to the most attractive wage oﬀers.
Ah i g hp o s t e dw attracts more applicants, which reduces workers’ contact
rate αw and raises the employer’s contact rate αe. In equilibrium, workers
are indiﬀerent about where to apply, at least among posted wages that at-
tract some workers. Firms choose wages to maximize expected proﬁt. Still
another approach assumes that workers post wages, and ﬁrm apply (direct
their search) to workers. As we said, these approaches are equivalent, in
the sense that they give rise to identical equilibrium conditions. Hence for
brevity in this section we consider only the case where ﬁrms post wages.
25The idea here is that market makers compete to attract workers and ﬁrms to their
submarkets since they can charge them an entrance fee, but in equilibrium this fee is 0
due to free entry into the market making business.
235.1 A One-Shot Model
We ﬁrst illustrate how the basic mechanism works in a static setting, then
extend things to a dynamic framework in order to facilitate comparison with
other models. Thus, at the beginning of the period, there are large numbers
u and v of unemployed workers and vacancies, and we let q∗ = u/v.E a c h
ﬁrm with a vacancy must pay cost k, and we can either assume free entry
(making v endogenous) or ﬁx the number of vacancies. Any match within
the period produces output y. At the end of the period, unmatched workers
get b, while unmatched vacancies get 0. Then the model ends.
First consider a worker facing a menu of diﬀerent wages. Let U denote
t h eh i g h e s tv a l u et h a th ec a ng e tb ya p p l y i n gf o raj o ba ts o m eﬁrm. Then
a worker is willing to apply to a particular job oﬀe r i n gaw a g ew ≥ b only if
he believes the queue length q at that job–i.e. the number of workers who
apply–is suﬃciently small. Equivalently, he is willing to apply only if the
hiring probability αw(q) is suﬃciently large, in the sense that
U ≤ αw(q)w +[ 1− αw(q)]b. (49)
In fact, if this inequality is strict, all workers would want to apply to this
ﬁrm, reducing the right hand side. Therefore, in equilibrium, if any workers
apply to a particular job, q will adjust to satisfy (49) with equality.
From an employer’s perspective, (49) describes how a change in his wage
w aﬀects his queue length q. Therefore he chooses w to maximize
V =m a x
w,q −k + αe(q)(y − w), (50)
taking (49) as a constraint. Eliminating w using (49) at equality, and also
using αe(q)=qαw(q),w eg e t
V =m a x
q {−k + αe(q)(y − b) − q(U − b)}. (51)
The ﬁrst order condition is
α
0
e(q)(y − b)=U − b. (52)
Since αe inherits the concavity of the matching function, this is necessary
and suﬃcient for proﬁt maximization.
24In particular, it implies that all employers choose the same q,w h i c hi n
equilibrium must equal the economy-wide q∗. Hence (52) pins down the
equilibrium value of U.T h e n( 4 9 )a te q u a l i t yd e t e r m i n e st h em a r k e tw a g e
w




(y − b)=b + ε(q




αe(q∗) is the elasticity of αe(q∗), which is in (0,1) by our
assumptions on m. Hence, w∗ ∈ (b,y). Comparing (53) with the results
in Section 4.2, notice that this wage rule operates as if the worker and
ﬁrm bargained over the gains from trade, with the workers’ share θ given
by the elasticity ε(q∗); this has important implications for the eﬃciency of
competitive search, as we discuss below.
Substituting (53) into (50) pins down





∗)](y − b). (54)
If the number of vacancies v is ﬁxed this gives proﬁt; or we can use free entry
V =0to endogenize v and hence q∗. In either case the model is simple to
apply, and can be used, e.g., to discuss the eﬀects of changes in b. Indeed,
things look a lot like a one-shot version of the model in the previous section.26
There is one key diﬀerence, however: w is determined as a share of the surplus
with the share θ now endogenously determined by ε(q∗).
Some interesting issues that show up even in this simple static model.
Montgomery (1991) had a nascent version of the above model (see also Peters
1984, 1991). He starts by exploring the case with two unemployed workers
and two vacancies, where ﬁrms post wages and then each worker applies for
aj o b .Aﬁrm that receives at least one application ﬁlls the job at the posted
w, and if more than one worker applies the ﬁrm randomly selects one.27
Suppose ﬁrms oﬀer the same w>0. Then there are three Nash equilibria in
the application subgame: worker 1 applies to ﬁr m1a n dw o r k e r2a p p l i e st o
ﬁrm 2; worker 1 applies to ﬁrm 2 and worker 2 applies to ﬁrm 1; and both
workers use identical mixed strategies, applying to each ﬁrm with probability
1/2. It seems reasonable to argue that the coordination implied by the ﬁrst
two equilibria is implausible, at least in a large labor market, and hence the
26We will discuss explicitly a one-shot version of the Pissarides model in Section 8.1.
27By assumption here ﬁrms post wages rather than more general mechanisms. Coles-
Eeckhout (2003) relax this (e.g., they allow w to be contingent on the number of applicants
who turn up) and show it does not aﬀect the main conclusions.
25mixed-strategy equilibrium is the natural outcome (see Montgomery 1991
and Burdett-Shi-Wright 2001). This introduces a coordination friction,a s
more than one worker may apply for the same job.
Generalizing this reasoning, suppose there are u unemployed workers and
v vacancies, for any u and v. If each worker applies to each ﬁrm with equal
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the limit of this expression as u and v go to inﬁnity while q = u/v remains
ﬁxed, we ﬁnd that in a large market the fraction αe(q)=1−e−q of ﬁrms get
a worker. This is a standard result in statistics: suppose there are u balls
independently placed with equal probability into each of v urns. Then for
large u and v, the number of balls per urn is a Poisson random variable with
mean u/v, and in particular a fraction e−u/v of the urns do not get any balls.
For this reason, the matching process generated by this type of coordination
friction is often called the urn-ball matching function.28
Because the urn-ball matching process provides an explicit microeconomic
story of both meetings (a ball is put in a particular urn) and matches (a ball
is chosen from that urn), it is suitable for environments with heterogeneous
workers (not all balls are the same). For instance, suppose there are u1
type 1 workers and u2 types 2 workers, with u = u1 + u2.I f a ﬁrm hires
a type 1 worker in preference to a type 2 worker whenever it receives an
appropriate application, then it hires a type 1 worker with probability 1 −
e−u1/v and a type 2 worker with probability e−u1/v ¡
1 − e−u2/v¢
.S u m m i n g
these, it hires some worker with probability 1 − e−u/v. This implies that
an increase in the number of undesirable type 2 workers does not adversely
aﬀect the matching rate for desirable type 1 workers, but desirable workers
adversely aﬀect the employment rate of undesirable workers. See Coles-
Eeckhout (2000), Shi (2002), and Shimer (2003) for more on competitive
search models with heterogeneity.
There are several other generalizations of this matching process. Burdett-
Shi-Wright (2001) let some ﬁrms hire multiple workers. Albrecht-Gautier-
28Notice that in the above discussion we ignored strategic interaction between ﬁrms: in
maximizing (50) subject to (49), the ﬁr mt a k e sa sg i v e nt h a taw o r k e r ’ sm a r k e tp a y o ﬀ
is U, but of course in general if any ﬁrm changes its w then U should change. Burdett-
Shi-Wright (2001) solve the model with any ﬁnite number of ﬁrms and workers, where
each ﬁrm must compute the eﬀect of a change in its w on the probability that any worker
applies to each ﬁr ma n do nt h ei m p l i e dU. In the limit as u and v grow, they show that
the problem reduces to the one analyzed here, where ﬁrms treat U as a parameter. This
makes competitive search relatively simple with large markets.
26Vroman (2003) and Albrecht-Gautier-Tan-Vroman (2004) allow workers to
make multiple applications. If workers can apply simultaneously for every
job, this eﬀectively ﬂips the standard urn-ball problem around, so workers
are urns and ﬁrms are balls, and a worker is employed if at least one ﬁrm
oﬀers him a job, which occurs with probability 1 − e−v/u;t h i si se x p l o r e di n
detail by Julien-Kennes-King (2000). Th ei n t e r m e d i a t ec a s ei nw h i c hw o r k e r s
can apply only for a subset of jobs delivers additional possibilities. In any
event, directed search models seem like a potentially interesting way to get
inside the black box of the matching process.
5.2 A Dynamic Model
To get something like the basic Pissarides model with directed search, start
with an unemployed worker. Suppose he anticipates an unemployment-
vacancy ratio q and a wage w.T h e n
rU = b + αw(q)[W(w) − U] (55)
rW(w)=w + λ[U − W(w)]. (56)
It will be convenient to combine these into





rV = −k + αe(q)[J(y − w) − V ] (58)
rJ(y − w)=y − w + λ[V − J(y − w)]. (59)





Now suppose ﬁrms choose w and q to maximize rV,o re q u i v a l e n t l yb y
free entry, to maximize αe(q)(y − w). They take (57) as given. Eliminating
w = rU+(rU−b)(r+λ)/αw(q) using the constraint, and again using αe(q)=







− q(rU − b)
¾
. (61)
27The necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst order condition α0
e(q)(y − rU)=( rU −
b)(r + λ) has a unique solution, so all ﬁr m sc h o o s et h es a m eq.S o l v i n gf o r
rU =
α0
e(q)y + b(r + λ)
r + λ + α0
e(q)
, (62)
it is now a matter of algebra to ﬁnd w a n di n s e r ti ti n t o( 6 0 )t oa r r i v ea t








This pins down the equilibrium q, or equivalently the arrival rates αw and
αe. Under standard conditions the solution is unique. We can again perform
our usual exercise of increasing b, with a similar result: it raises the u/v
ratio, which reduces αw, and through the zero proﬁt condition increases w.
But although the conclusions are similar to those reached in the random
search model with bargaining, the economic mechanism is quite diﬀerent.
An increase in b here makes workers more willing to accept an increase in
the risk of unemployment in return for an increase in w. Firms respond by
oﬀering workers what they want–fewer jobs at higher wages.
5.3 Discussion
In addition to having a more explicit description of the matching process,
an advantage of competitive search models is that they provide a deeper
explanation for wages than bargaining, where w divides the surplus into
exogenous shares. Here workers face a trade-oﬀ between a higher w and a
lower probability of getting a job, while ﬁrms face a trade-oﬀ between proﬁt
and the probability of hiring. Competition among wage setters, whether
these be ﬁrms, workers or market makers, yields a unique point along the
indiﬀerence curves of both agents, optimally trading oﬀ wages and matching
rates (see Section 8). However, perhaps a disadvantage of any posting model
is that it makes a strong assumption when it says agents commit to the
posted terms of trade. If the market is truly decentralized, what prevents
them from trying to bargain for a diﬀerent w after they meet?29
29Another apparent drawback is that the simplest competitive search model predicts
there is a single wage, but this is easily remedied. One can introduce match-speciﬁc
productivity y, and have agents post a wage contract w(y) rather than a single w.I ne q u i -
28In terms of extensions, Shi (2001,2002) and Shimer (2003) add hetero-
geneous agents to competitive search models, which introduces wage disper-
sion among heterogeneous workers, and among identical workers depending
o nt h e i re m p l o y e r . A c e m o g l u - S h i m e r( 1 9 9 9 )c o n s i d e ram o d e lw h e r ew o r k -
ers are risk-averse, which has a similar basic structure except that it is no
longer possible to eliminate the wage from the employer’s objective function
and solve the model explicitly. They show that an increase in risk-aversion
reduces the equilibrium wage, while an increase in b raises it. Put diﬀerently,
market incompleteness lowers w, and this can potentially be oﬀset through
UI policy. Building on this, Acemoglu-Shimer (2000) show in a calibrated
model UI can enhance productivity.
6 Nontransferable Utility
Economists usually model employment relationships under the assumption
of transferable utility:i faw o r k e ra n dﬁrm together produce y, it is divided
between them so that the former gets w and the latter π = y−w.N o t et h a t
transferable utility in the jargon of the literature means perfectly linearly
transferable: every increase in the worker’s payoﬀ comes 1-for-1 with a de-
crease in the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ. The above models all have this feature. However,
it is clear that there can be aspects of employment relationships that do not
ﬁt this description, such as the job’s location or how one gets along with one’s
boss.30 Moreover, it is not uncommon to observe regulations or wage-setting
institutions that eﬀectively ﬁx w or at least limit its ﬂexibility for a given
type of labor, including minimum wage laws, occupation- or industry-wide
unions, and so on.
Motivated by these considerations, some researchers have explored la-
bor market models with nontransferable utility. Moving beyond the labor
market, many search-based models of the marriage market view nontrans-
ferable utility as the natural benchmark. Hence, it seems worth reviewing
the framework. Note that while in general these models could assume util-
librium the worker and ﬁrm agree on whether to match, using a reservation productivity
rule yR. The exact structure of the wage contract is ambiguous, as long as the parties are
risk neutral, but in any case the basic structure of the model is unchanged. On-the-job
productivity changes also ﬁt naturally and can generate wage dispersion.
30Even if you could get an increase in w to compensate for not liking your boss, it is
unlikely that every unit reduction in proﬁt would yield a unit increase in your utility.
29ity is partially transferable, but just not linearly, the relevant results can be
captured by the case where it is not transferable at all, so this is what we
consider. One reason why nontransferable utility models are of particular in-
terest is because they imply, in contrast to what we have seen elsewhere, that
two parties may not agree on whether it is a good idea to form or maintain a
relationship, thereby providing an alternative perspective on match creation
and destruction.
6.1 Homogeneous Agents
Assume a large ﬁxed number of workers and, for simplicity, an equal number
of ﬁrms. Given workers and employers match in pairs, the fraction of work-
e r sw h oa r eu n e m p l o y e di sa l w a y se q u a lt ot h ef r a c t i o no fe m p l o y e r sw i t h
vacancies. Hence, with constant returns m(u,u)=α0u,s oαe = αw = α0
is constant. Also assume for now that agents are ex ante identical, but
each worker and employer has idiosyncratic tastes over matches. Follow-
ing Burdett-Wright (1998), we formalize this by assuming that in a random
meeting the payoﬀs to the worker and employer are given by zw and ze,w h e r e
zw and ze are independent draws from distributions Fw and Fe. These pay-
oﬀs can include both pecuniary and non-pecuniary attributes. Workers and
employers die at rate δw and δe, at which point they are replaced by identical
agents who start life unmatched. There is also an exogenous separation rate
λ0. Agents cannot search while matched.31
A key feature of this setup is that when two agents meet their payoﬀs
from consummating the match are not perfectly correlated–e.g. it may be
good for the worker but not the ﬁrm, but by assumption there is nothing the
former can do to aﬀect the latter’s evaluation (again, what is critical is only
that they cannot transfer utility linearly). For a match to be consummated
it must be mutually acceptable. Since a given agent may not be acceptable
to everyone he meets, the eﬀective arrival rates αw and αe are not necessarily
t h es a m ea st h ec o n t a c tr a t eα0, and need to be determined endogenously.
First note that every agent of type j ∈ {w,e},t a k i n gαj and δj para-
31We assume search is costless for all unmatched agents–e.g. there is no cost k to posting
a vacancy. Cornelius (2000, 2003) and Burdett-Imai-Wright (2004) relax some of these
assumptions, and in particular allow on-the-job search. This leads to some interesting
outcomes, including endogenous instability: it may be an (ineﬃcient) equilibrium for a
worker to be looking for another job because he believes his employer is trying to replace
him, which is true because the worker is looking for a new job.
30metrically, faces a standard single-agent search problem, which is solved by
a reservation utility level wj satisfying a version of (15) (although wj is a
reservation utility level rather than a reservation wage, the same methods
still). For a worker,
ww = b +
αw
r + δw + λw
Z ∞
ww
[1 − Fw(zw)]dzw, (64)
where αw and λw are his (expected) arrival and layoﬀ rates. A symmetric
equation holds for ﬁrms, giving their reservation utility level we.
In equilibrium, as we said, not all contacts result in an oﬀer. For workers,
αw = α0[1 − Fe(we)],s i n c et og e ta no ﬀer they need a contact and the
employer must be willing to hire them, which requires ze ≥ we. Also, even if
λ0 is exogenous, agents still have to worry about death on the other side of
the market. Hence, for workers, e.g., λw = λ0 + δe. Substituting αw and λw
into (64) we have
ww = b +
α0[1 − Fe(we)]
r + δw + δe + λ0
Z ∞
ww
[1 − Fw(zw)]dzw. (65)
This implies a relation ww = ρw(we),w h i c hi st h ebest response function of
workers to the strategy of ﬁrms.32 Symmetrically, we have we = ρe(ww).A
steady-state equilibrium is given by an intersection of the two best response
functions in (ww,w e) space.
One can show that equilibrium exists, and is unique under a log-concavity
assumption. However, without log-concavity equilibrium is not generally
unique. The intuition is as follows. Suppose one side of the market, say
workers, are very demanding about the kinds of oﬀers they accept (ww is
high). Then on the other side, ﬁrms get few oﬀers, and so they cannot aﬀord
to be too demanding (we is low). This means the workers get plenty of oﬀers,
which justiﬁes being demanding. So, high ww and low we could be a self-
fulﬁlling prophecy, but so could exactly the opposite scenario. In general,
the steady-state equilibrium unemployment (equals vacancy) rate is given by
u
∗ =
λ0 + δe + δw
λ0 + δe + δw + H
, (66)
32Here the dependence of ww on we occurs only through αw = α0[1 − Fe(we)].B u t
suppose z changes during the relationship at rate λ,a si nS e c t i o n3 . 2 2 ;t h e nλw = λ0 +
δe + λFe(we). Hence, generally both the arrival and layoﬀ rates for one side depend on
strategies on the other side of the market.
31where H = α0[1 − Fw(ww)][1 − Fe(we)] depends on which equilibrium we
select. See Burdett-Wright (1998) for more discussion.
Even when there is a unique equilibrium, this model has interesting im-
plications. A neat example is Masters (1999), who adds to the above frame-
work an ex ante stage where the wage is determined endogenously, but still
assumes that utility is nontransferable ex post when agents meet. Again
under a log-concavity assumption, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium
i nt h ee xa n t ew a g eg a m e ,w∗.G i v e n w∗, some meetings result in a match
being consummated while others do not, depending on the random non-wage
characteristics. His key result is that w∗ is less than the value that minimizes
unemployment. Hence, an increase in the legislated minimum wage leads to
a reduction in unemployment.33
6.2 Heterogeneous Agents
Burdett-Coles (1997) consider a version of the model in which individuals are
ex ante heterogeneous (see also Eeckhout 1999). For simplicity, suppose that
a random worker is valued by a ﬁrm at ze ∼ Fe, while a random employer is
valued by a worker at zw ∼ Fw. In the homogeneous-agent model, all workers
were equally likely to be accepted by any ﬁrm, and similarly for workers. Here
better workers are acceptable to a larger subset of ﬁrms, and similarly better
employers are acceptable to a larger set of workers.34 H e n c ew ed e ﬁne an
indicator function such that aw(ze,z w)=1if a type ze worker is willing to
accept a type zw ﬁrm and 0 otherwise, and analogously deﬁne ae(zw,z e) as
the willingness of a type zw ﬁrm to hire a type ze worker. Because utility is
nontransferable, aw(ze,z w) need not equal ae(zw,z e).
As in previous models, agents use reservation strategies, so aw(ze,z w)=1
iﬀ zw ≥ ww(ze) and ae(zw,z e)=1iﬀ ze ≥ we(zw). The usual methods lead
to the worker’s reservation equation
ww(ze)=b +
α0
r + δw + δe + λ0
Z ∞
ww(ze)
ae(zw,z e)[zw − ww(ze)]dFw(zw), (67)
while ﬁrms have a similar equation for we(zw). Using (67) it is straightforward
to see that if a type z0
e worker has worse matching opportunities than a
33A similar story can be found in labor economics textbooks–i.e., market power by
ﬁrms yields a w that is too low, and hence a minimum wage can reduce unemployment.
But these stories usually do not model unemployment in a serious way.
34An interesting extension is to let agents choose their type, as in Burdett-Coles (2001).
32type ze worker–i.e. if ae(zw,z e) ≥ ae(zw,z0
e) for all zw–then z0
e will have a
lower reservation utility level than ze, and if the matching opportunities are
identical the reservation utility levels are identical. A similar result holds for
employers.
This leads to the following insight: in equilibrium, workers and employers
will endogenously match in classes. Within any class, any worker is willing
to take any job and any employer is willing to hire any worker. A worker
refuses a job from any employer in a lower class, while employers refuse to hire
any worker in a lower class. In such an equilibrium all workers within a class
have the same matching opportunities and therefore use the same reservation
utility level. Workers in lower classes have worse matching opportunities and
hence are willing to accept worse employers. The class structure follows
immediately.
Burdett-Coles (1997) also show that multiple equilibria can exist. Indi-
vidual reservation utility levels depend on matching opportunities as sum-
marized by Fe and Fw. But diﬀerent individuals have endogenously diﬀerent
probabilities of ﬁn d i n gaj o b .T h i si m p l i e sm a t c h i n gd e c i s i o n sa ﬀect matching
opportunities. Suppose, for example, that there are two types of workers and
two types of jobs, with good workers and good employers scarcer than bad
workers or bad employers. There can exist two equilibria. In one, all matches
are consummated, so all workers have the same unemployment rate and all
employers the same vacancy rate. In the other, good workers only match
with good employers. Since good workers and good employers are scarce,
these matches form less frequently than matches between bad workers and
bad employers. This increases the presence of good types in the searching
population, justifying individuals’ decision to be choosy.35
6.3 Discussion
Nontransferable utility models can sometimes be interpreted, as in Masters’
(1999), as describing situations where w can adjust endogenously before
meetings occur, but not after. In this sense they are similar to competi-
tive search models, although the models in this section do not allow agents
to direct their search. In the next section we also consider models where
wages are not negotiable within the match and search is random, but the
focus is on deriving equilibria with nondegenerate wage dispersion.
35Once again, one can show that log-concavity precludes this type of multiplicity.
337 Wage Dispersion
We have considered theories with various assumptions about job creation,
job destruction, and wage formation, but they all have one thing in common:
two identical workers, with the same productivity at a given ﬁrm and the
same outside options, earn the same w. In this sense the models do not
provide a pure theory of wage dispersion. While obviously many models
generate wage dispersion for heterogeneous workers, in this section we are
interested in dispersion across workers of a given type. One reason such
models are of interest is as follows. Early (decision-theoretic) work suggested
that search is relevant only if the distribution from which you are sampling
is non-degenerate. So theorists were naturally led to try to develop models
of wage dispersion. It is also true that some people believe dispersion is a
fact of life, and for them the issues were empirical rather than theoretical.36
In any case, a model of pure dispersion was the goal.
Diamond (1971) provides an early attempt to construct such a model,
and although it did not work, it is very useful to understand why. Consider
an economy where homogeneous workers each face the basic search problem
described earlier. We do not give all the particulars here, since the underlying
model is a special case of ones described in detail below, but the key is that
the oﬀer distribution F is generated by wage-posting ﬁrms, each of which
has a constant returns to scale technology with labor as the only input and
commits to hire any worker it contacts who is willing to accept the posted
wage. Consider an individual ﬁrm with productivity p, where the discussion
does not depend on p being constant or diﬀerent across ﬁrms. Letting F
be the distribution of wages posted by other ﬁrms, he wants to maximize
expected proﬁtt a k i n gF as given. By deﬁnition, in equilibrium every wage
posted with positive probability earns the same proﬁt and no other wage
earns greater proﬁt.
Diamond proves a rather striking result: there is a unique equilibrium,
and in equilibrium all employers set the same wage, equal to workers’ unem-
ployment income, w = b. The proof is simple. Given any F, since workers
36As Mortensen (2003, p.1) reports, “Although hundreds if not thousands of empirical
studies that estimate so-called human capital wage equations verify that worker charac-
teristics that one could view as indicators of labor productivity are positively related to
wages earned, the theory is woefully incomplete in its explanatory power. Observable
worker characteristics that are supposed to account for productivity diﬀerences typically
explain no more that 30 percent of the variation in compensation.”
34are homogeneous they all choose the same reservation wage wR. Clearly, no
ﬁrm will post w<w R a st h i sw o u l dm e a nt h e yc a n n o th i r e ,a n dn oﬁrm will
post w>w R as they can hire every worker they contact at w = wR.T o
see why it turns out that w = b in equilibrium, consider an individual ﬁrm
when all ﬁrms are posting w>b .I f i t d e v i a t e s a n d o ﬀers a wage slightly
less than w it will still hire every worker it meets. Since this is true for
any w>b ,w em u s th a v ew = b. There is a single wage. The model not
only fails to rationalize wage dispersion in the data, it fails to explain why
workers are searching in the ﬁrst place! Many researchers subsequently tried
to develop models where the equilibrium distribution is non-degenerate, and
we will review several alternatives.37
7.1 Worker Heterogeneity
To motivate the various models that follow, ask yourself why might one
expect to ﬁnd pure wage dispersion? One answer is that search frictions
produce a natural trade-oﬀ for ﬁrms: while posting a higher wage results
in lower proﬁt per worker, it potentially could get you more workers. In
the Diamond model this trade-oﬀ is non-existent, since in equilibrium if you
increase your wage above wR t h e r ei sn oi n c r e a s ei nt h er a t ea tw h i c hy o u
hire, given all workers use the same reservation wage. The Albrecht-Axel
(1984) model allows for heterogeneity in workers and hence in reservation
wages, making the trade-oﬀ operational. In particular, assume there are two
types of workers, some with b = b1 and others with b = b2 >b 1 (one could
generalize to N w o r k e rt y p e sb u tt h ep o i n tc a nb em a d ew i t hN =2 ).
Now for any wage distribution F, there are two reservation wages, w1
and w2 >w 1. The generalization of Diamond is that no ﬁrm posts a wage
other than w1 or w2, but it seems possible that these two wages could yield
equal proﬁt, since low-wage ﬁrms hire only workers with b = b1 while high-
wage ﬁrms hire everyone. Albrecht-Axel show that wage dispersion is the
equilibrium outcome for a large set of parameter values.38 To see how this
37In addition to the models presented below, contributions to the wage or price distribu-
tion literature include Butters (1977), Reinganum (1979), MacMinn (1980), Burdett-Judd
(1983), Robb (1985) and Diamond (1987).
38Several details deserve mention. First, Albrect-Axel do not actually have ﬁrms earning
equal proﬁt, but allow p to vary and look for a cutoﬀ p∗ such that ﬁrms with p<p ∗ pay
w = w1 and those with p>p ∗ pay w = w2. Also, in some of the models in this section we
assume ﬁrms care only about steady state proﬁt, which is reasonable when r ≈ 0.A l s o ,
35works, normalize the measure of ﬁrms to 1, and let the measure of workers be
L = L1 +L2 where Lj is the measure with bj.A sw es a i d ,a l lt y p e1w o r k e r s
have reservation wage w1,a l lt y p e2h a v ew2 >w 1, and in equilibrium all
ﬁrms post either w1 or w2.L e tσ be the endogenous fraction of ﬁrms posting
w2. Any candidate equilibrium wage distribution is completely summarized
by w1, w2 and σ.
It should be easy to see that the highest wage posted is w2 = b2.T o
determine w1,n o t et h a tt y p e1w o r k e r sa c c e p tb o t hw = w1 and w = w2,
and so their value functions satisfy:
rU1 = b1 + ασ[W1(w2) − U1] (68)
rW1(w1)=w1 (69)
rW1(w2)=w2 + λ[U1 − W1(w2)] (70)
Note that although b1 workers accept w = w1, they get no capital gain from
doing so and suﬀer no capital loss when laid oﬀ from w1.U s i n gW1(w1)=U1
and w2 = b2, we obtain an equation relating w1 to σ,
w1 =
(r + λ)b1 + ασb2
r + λ + ασ
. (71)
The unemployment rates for the two types are u1 = λ
α+λ and u2 = λ
ασ+λ,
and the employment rates are e1 =1− u1 and e2 =1− u2.F o rﬁrms, the
expected value of contacting a worker is the product of the probability he
accepts and the proﬁt if he accepts. The acceptance probability is L1u1
L1u1+L2u2



















Algebra reveals that the proﬁtd i ﬀerence V2 − V1 is proportional to
T(σ)=( r + λ + ασ){(p − b2)[λL1 +( α + λ)L2] − (p − b1)λL1}
−rασL1(b2 − b1). (74)
instead of random matching, one could alternatively assume you are more likely to meet
large ﬁrms (Burdett-Vishnawath 1988b; Robin-Roux 1998). Finally, we simply assume
ﬁrms can commit to w even though they may have incentive ex post to change; Coles
(2001) supports this by reputational considerations.
36Hence σ =0is an equilibrium if T(0) < 0; σ =1is an equilibrium if
T(1) > 0;a n dσ ∈ (0,1) is an equilibrium if T(σ)=0 . I ti se a s yt os h o w
there exists a unique equilibrium, and 0 <σ<1 iﬀ p <p<p where
p = b2 +
λL1(b2 − b1)
(α + λ)L2
and p = p +
rαL1(b2 − b1)
(r + α + λ)(α + λ)L2
. (75)
When productivity is low all ﬁrms pay w1 = b1,w h e ni ti sh i g ha l lﬁrms
pay w2 = b2, and when it is intermediate there is wage dispersion. When
σ ∈ (0,1),w ec a ns o l v eT(σ)=0for σ and use (71) to derive w1 explicitly,
and the distribution of wages across employed workers is constructed by
noting that ej =1− uj workers earn wj.N o t e t h a t σ will be less than e2
(the fractions of ﬁrms posting w2 is less than the fraction of workers earning
w2)s i n c eh i g hw a g eﬁrms succeed in hiring more workers. Of course, it is
precisely this fact that equates V1 and V2.
7.2 A Shirking/Crime Model
In the Albrecht-Axel model ﬁrms may pay higher wages in order to recruit
at a faster rate. An alternative idea is that they may pay higher wages
to retain workers. Here we present one such model, which can either be
interpreted in terms of shirking or crime, since regardless of the interpretation
the outcome is similar.39 Thus, any employed worker randomly comes across
an opportunity to shirk or engage in crime at rate µ, with gross reward K.
However, there is a probability ν of getting caught and being forced into
unemployment–more generally, in crime models when a worker is caught he
can be put in jail for a while, but for simplicity here we assume jail time
is zero since what matters for the purpose of generating wage dispersion is
simply that the match ends.40
To show how things diﬀer from Albrecht-Axel, assume that workers are
homogeneous. This implies that there is a common reservation wage wR,a n d
39See Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) or Weiss (1980) for eﬃciency-wage models with shirking,
and Burdett-Lagos-Wright (2003, 2004) or Huang-Laing-Wang (2004) for search-based
models of crime. The presentation here follows Burdett-Lagos-Wright (2003).
40One reason that jail is interesting in the model is the following. In basic eﬃciency
wage models, the ﬁrm is supposed to punish a worker caught shirking by laying him oﬀ,
but this is not really in the ﬁrm’s interest: what is the point of getting rid of a worker only
to search for another who will behave the same? If the police take him away, however, the
issue does not come up (i.e., third party enforcement helps on this dimension).
37ﬁrms can hire any worker they contact by posting wR. However, a plausible
alternative is to pay something above wR t oi n d u c eaw o r k e rt or e f r a i nf r o m
the activity in question (shirking or crime). Firms may ﬁnd this proﬁtable
since, after all, they suﬀer a capital loss when workers leave. To see how
it works, let wC >w R denote the critical wage at which a worker would
refrain from the activity in question rather than risk losing his job, deﬁned
by K +ν[U −W(wC)] = 0. It is clear that in equilibrium no ﬁrm would post
anything other than wR or wC.A sa b o v e ,l e tσ be the fraction posting the
higher wage.
Bellman’s equation for a worker are:
rU = b + ασ[W(wC) − U] (76)
rW(wR)=wR + µK (77)
rW(wC)=wC + λ[U − W(wC)] (78)
Although they accept wR, they get no capital gain from doing so and suﬀer no
capital loss from losing wR.U s i n gK +ν[U −W(wC)] = 0 and W(wR)=U,
we can solve for
wC = b +( r + λ + ασ)K/ν (79)
wR = b − µK + ασK/ν. (80)
All ﬁr m sr e c r u i ta tt h es a m er a t eαLu, but those paying wR lose workers
at rate λ + µν while those paying wC lose workers at rate λ. Hence,
VR =
p − wR
r + λ + µν
=
p − b + µK − ασK/ν






p − b − (r + λ + ασ)K/ν
r + λ
. (82)
Algebra reveals that VC − VR is proportional to
T(σ)=µν(p − b) − (r + λ)
2K/ν − µ(2r +2 λ + ασ)K. (83)
As in Albrecht-Axel, there is a unique equilibrium and 0 <σ<1 iﬀ p is
in some intermediate region. Although the details of the two models are
diﬀerent, the economics is similar: the reason for paying higher wages is that
in the end this gets you more workers.
387.3 On-the-Job Search
In the previous two models ﬁrms may pay higher wages to either increase the
inﬂow or reduce the outﬂow of workers. The Burdett-Mortensen (1998) model
incorporates both of these ideas by featuring on-the-job search. As in Section
3, the arrival rates here are α0 and α1 while unemployed and employed,
and every oﬀer is a random draw from F(w). For ease of presentation we
b e g i nw i t ht h ec a s eα0 = α1 = α, which implies wR = b by (19), and
return to the general case later. Since all unemployed workers use a common
reservation wage, and clearly no ﬁrm posts w<w R, all jobs are accepted by
the unemployed and we have u = λ/(λ + α).
In this model, the worker inﬂow for a ﬁrm posting w depends upon the
distribution of wages across employed workers G(w), since to steal an em-
ployed worker you need to beat his current wage.41 We now compute G(w),
given a distribution of oﬀers F(w). At any w, the number of workers em-
ployed at a wage no greater than w is G(w)(1−u). This increases over time
at rate αuF (w), the rate at which unemployed workers contact a ﬁrm paying
less than w, and decreases over time at rate {λ+α[1−F (w)]G(w)}(1−u),
t h er a t ea tw h i c hw o r k e r se m p l o y e da tl e s st h a nw are terminated for exoge-
n o u sr e a s o n sp l u st h er a t ea tw h i c ht h e ym o v et oﬁr m sp a y i n gm o r et h a nw.
Equating these ﬂows and inserting u = λ/(λ + α),w eh a v e
G(w)=
λF (w)
λ + α[1 − F (w)]
. (84)
If a ﬁrm posts w ≥ wR, a worker he contacts accepts if he is currently
unemployed or currently employed but at a lower wage, which occurs with
probability u +( 1− u)G(w). The employment relationship then yields ﬂow
proﬁt p − w until the worker leaves either due to an exogenous separation




{λ + α[1 − F (w)]}{r + λ + α[1 − F(w)]}
. (85)
Again, equilibrium requires that any posted w yields the same proﬁt, which
is at least as large as proﬁt from any other wage. Clearly no ﬁrm posts
41The basic model assumes that ﬁrms do not respond to outside oﬀers with counter-
oﬀers, but this can be relaxed; see Postel-Vinay-Robin (2002).
39w<w R = b or w>p . In fact, one can show that the support of F is [b, ¯ w]
for some ¯ w<p , and there are neither gaps nor mass points on the support.
We now construct F explicitly. The key step is to use the fact that
ﬁrms earn equal proﬁts from all posted wages, including the lowest wage
b: V (w)=V (b) for every w ∈ [b, ¯ w].S i n c e F(b)=0 ,w eh a v eV (b)=
αλ(p − b)/(α + λ)(r + α + λ). Combining this and (85) gives an equation











We know the lower bound is b, and the upper bound ¯ w can easily be found
by solving F(¯ w)=1 . This yields the unique distribution consistent with
equal proﬁt for all wages posted.
In words, the outcome is as follows. All unemployed workers accept the
ﬁrst oﬀer they receive since all ﬁrms post w ≥ wR = b. Then workers move
u pt h ew a g el a d d e re a c ht i m eab e t t e ro ﬀer comes along, but also return to
unemployment periodically due to random layoﬀs. There is a nondegenerate
distribution of wages posted by ﬁrms, F, and of wages earned by workers,
G. The model has job-to-job transitions and is consistent with several of
the other observations about workers that on-the-job search models display.
Additionally, it makes predictions about ﬁrms, including e.g. the prediction
that high wage ﬁrms are bigger.












where now wR is endogenous (with α0 = α1 we knew wR = b). To determine
wR, integrate (19) to get
wR =
(λ + α1)
2 b +( α0 − α1)α1p
(λ + α1)
2 +( α0 − α1)α1
. (88)
One can check that in the limit as α1 → 0, ¯ w → wR, which means there is a
single wage, w = wR = b; this is the Diamond result as a special case. Also,
one can show that in the limit as α1 →∞ , ¯ w = p and G(w)=0for all
w<p ;h e n c ea l lw o r k e r se a r nw = p.M o r e o v e r ,a sα0 →∞ , clearly u → 0.
Hence, the competitive solution emerges when α0 and α1 get large.
40One can also let ﬁrms be heterogenous with respect to p. In equilibrium
there is a distribution of wages paid by each type of ﬁrm, and all ﬁrms
with productivity p2 pay more than all ﬁrms with p1 <p 2.T h u s , h i g h e r
productivity ﬁrms are more likely to hire and less likely to lose any worker.
With heterogeneous ﬁrms, van den Berg (2003) shows there may be multiple
equilibria, while in the base case there is a unique equilibrium (the one we
constructed). Perhaps more signiﬁcantly, ﬁrm heterogeneity is an important
extension empirically, because with homogeneous ﬁrms the equilibrium wage
distribution (86) has an increasing density, which is not consistent with the
data. With heterogeneity F can have a decreasing density. See Mortensen
(2003) for additional discussion and references.
In another generalization, Stevens (2004) allows ﬁrms to post wage-tenure
contracts, rather than simply a constant w.S h es h o w sﬁrms have an incen-
tive to back load wages to reduce turnover. If workers can make an up-front
payment for a job, an optimal contract extracts an initial fee and then pays
w = p.I fﬁrms are homogeneous this contract eliminates all voluntary quits.
In equilibrium all ﬁrms demand the same initial fee, and this leaves unem-
ployed workers indiﬀerent about accepting the position. Stevens also shows
that if initial payments are impossible, say because of liquidity constraints,
there is an equilibrium where all ﬁrms oﬀer a contract that pays the worker 0
for a ﬁx e da p p r e n t i c e s h i pp e r i o da n dt h e np a y sw = p.A g a i n ,i fﬁrms are ho-
mogeneous they extract all of the surplus, there are no job-to-job transitions,
and all contracts are identical.
However Burdett-Coles (2003) show that Stevens’s results can be over-
turned if workers desire smooth consumption. They allow ﬁrms to commit to
wage-tenure contracts, but assume workers are risk-averse and do not have
access to ﬁnancial markets, and so must consume w each period. They prove
all equilibrium wage-tenure contracts are described by a common baseline
salary scale, which is an increasing, continuous relationship between w and
tenure. Firms oﬀer diﬀerent contracts in the sense that they start workers
at diﬀerent point on the scale. For instance, a ﬁrm might start a worker
with an eﬀe c t i v et e n u r eo f1m o n t h .T h r e em o n t h sl a t e r ,h i se ﬀective tenure
has increased to 4 months. If he then gets an outside job oﬀer which starts
with tenure of less than 4, he turns it down, but he accepts any more lucra-
tive oﬀer, getting a discrete increase in w when he does. Thus, consumption
smoothing reintroduces wage dispersion, both in the sense that workers get
diﬀerent wages depending on their tenure, and in the more fundamental sense
that ﬁrms oﬀer diﬀerent contracts.
417.4 Other Issues
W eh a v er e v i e w e dt h r e ed i s t i n c tm o d e l so fw a g ed i s p e r s i o n ,b u to fc o u r s e
one can combine them–for example, by integrating on-the-job-search into
the crime model (Burdett-Lagos-Wright 2004). It is especially important
to combine on-the-job search with worker heterogeneity. This is because,
although Burdett-Mortensen (with heterogeneous ﬁrms) does a good job ac-
counting for wages, it does less well accounting for individual employment
histories, especially the fact that hazard rates decrease with the length of the
spells. Albrecht-Axel does better at accounting for this, but not so well for
wages. Models that combine on-the-job search and worker heterogeneity can
potentially account for both (Bontemps-Robin-van den Berg 1999).
It is also possible to add a free-entry condition and thereby endogenize
t h ea r r i v a lr a t eo fo ﬀers. Mortensen (2000) does this for Burdett-Mortensen;
for variety we will do it for Albrecht-Axel. Thus, rather than having a ﬁxed
number of ﬁrms that meet workers at some constant rate, hiring as many as
they can, suppose now that, to attract workers, ﬁrms post vacancies, where
each vacancy can be ﬁlled by at most 1 worker. The rest of the setup is
the same as Albrecht-Axel. Thus, any equilibrium wage distribution has a
fraction σ of vacancies posting w2 = b2 and the remaining 1 − σ posting w1,
and we have u1 = λ
α+λ and u2 = λ
ασ+λ.
We now need to be more careful with the arrival rates. In general one
can assume any matching function, but for simplicity consider m(u,v)=
Amin{u,v}. Assume that ﬁrms enter, or post vacancies, as long as expected
proﬁte x c e e d st h eﬁxed cost of entry, k. Clearly, we will have v ≥ L as long
as the cost of entry is not too high, since ﬁrms make positive proﬁtw h e n
v = L.G i v e n v ≥ L we know v ≥ u; so the arrival rate for workers is the
ﬁxed constant α = A, and the arrival rate for ﬁrms is αu/v.T h e r a t e a t
which a ﬁrm meets type j workers is therefore α
vLjuj.L e tVj and Jj be the
value functions for a ﬁrm given it posts wj.S i n c e a ﬁrm posting w1 hires




L1u1(J1 − V1) (89)
rJ1 = p − w1 + λ(J1 − V1). (90)
The entry condition says that if any ﬁrms paying w1 enter, we must have
V1 = k. Inserting this and solving we get




p − w1 − rk
r + λ
. (91)
42Repeating the exercise for any ﬁrm posting w2,w eh a v e
rV2 = rk =
αu
v
p − w2 − rk
r + λ
. (92)
E n t r yb yb o t ht y p e si m p l i e srV1 = rk = rV2,o r
T(σ)=u(p − w2) − L1u1(p − w1) − L2u2rk =0 . (93)
Comparing this with (74), it reduces to exactly the equilibrium condition for
our version of the Albrecht-Axel model when r is small.
8E ﬃciency
An advantage of equilibrium models is that we can discuss welfare. What
form do eﬃcient allocations take? Under what conditions are decentralized
equilibria eﬃcient? We now turn our attention to these questions. Before
we begin, note that in an economy with many agents there can be many
Pareto eﬃcient allocations. Here, we focus on those that maximize the sum
of agents’ utility, or equivalently, that maximize the present discounted value
of output, net of the disutility of work and search, and of the cost of posting
vacancies.
8.1 A One-Shot Model
Initially, u workers are unmatched. Firms decide how many vacancies v to
post, each at cost k,a n dt h e nm(u,v) matches form. Let q = u/v, and assume
constant returns, so m(u,v)=vm(q,1) = vαe(q). Each match produces y at
an opportunity cost b to each worker. Then the economy ends. Firms post
v a c a n c i e su n t i lt h ef r e ee n t r yc o n d i t i o n
αe(q)(1 − θ)(y − b)=k (94)
holds. Assume provisionally that wages are determined by bargaining, w =
θy +( 1− θ)b. This is a static version of the basic Pissarides model.
Now consider a social planner who decides how many vacancies should be
posted to maximize output, net of workers’ opportunity cost and the cost of
posting vacancies. Equivalently, the planner chooses q = u/v,k n o w i n gt h a t
each vacancy will contact a worker with probability αe(q),t om a x i m i z e
uαw(q)(y − b) − vk =
u
q
[αe(q)(y − b) − k]. (95)
43The necessary and suﬃcient condition for a solution is
[αe(q) − qα
0
e(q)](y − b)=k. (96)
Denote the planner’s solution by q∗.
T h ef o l l o w i n gi si m m e d i a t ef r o m( 9 4 )a nd (96): the planner’s solution and







αe(q∗) was deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n5a st h ee l a s t i c i t yo fαe(q).
This is called the Hosios condition (Hosios 1991). It determines the share
of the surplus that must go to workers, θ
∗ = ε(q∗), for bargaining to be
eﬃcient.42 Alternatively, in terms of wages, equilibrium is eﬃcient if w =
w∗ = θ
∗y +( 1− θ
∗)b.I fθ is too high, e.g., then w>w ∗ and v is too low.
Now consider competitive search. Recalling (53), in competitive search
equilibrium we have w = w∗, and equilibrium is necessarily eﬃcient. One
could say that the Hosios condition holds endogenously (i.e. although there
is no bargaining, the surplus is still being split, and the shares are consistent
with eﬃciency). To understand why, it is useful to think of competitive search
in terms of competition between market makers, as discussed in Section 5. In
an environment with free entry, a market maker in his attempt to earn proﬁt
eﬀectively maximizes workers’ expected utility, αw(q)(w − b), recognizing
that ﬁrms must earn zero proﬁts αe(q)(y − w)=k to participate Using
the constraint to eliminate w s h o w st h a tt h i si si d e n t i c a lt ot h ep l a n n e r ’ s
objective function.
Now consider adding search intensity by workers. The total number of
matches is m(¯ su,v),w h e r e¯ s is average intensity. Again assuming constant
returns, a ﬁrm hires with probability αe(¯ sq)=m(¯ sq,1), while a worker with
search intensity s gets hired with probability sαw(¯ sq)=sαe(¯ sq)/¯ sq.A n
unemployed worker chooses s to maximize
b − g(s)+
sαe(¯ sq)θ(y − b)
¯ sq
. (98)
In equilibrium all workers choose the same s =¯ s,w h e r e
g
0(¯ s)=
αe(¯ sq)θ(y − b)
¯ sq
, (99)






αw(q) =1 ; hence the condition can equiv-
alently be stated as ﬁrms’ bargaining power 1 − θ must equal the elasticity of αw(q).
44and free entry by ﬁrms implies
k = αe(¯ sq)(1 − θ)(y − b). (100)




b − g(¯ s)+









e(¯ sq)(y − b) (102)
k =[ αe(¯ sq) − ¯ sqα
0
e(¯ sq)](y − b). (103)
Notice something interesting: (99) and (102) coincide if the Hosios condition
θ = ε(¯ sq) holds, while (100) and (103) coincide under the same condition.
That is, bargaining equilibrium achieves eﬃcient search intensity and entry
under the Hosios condition. This seems genuinely surprising, as there are
two variables to be determined, ¯ s and v, and 1 free parameter, θ.
Since we have already shown that in competitive search equilibrium we get
the Hosios condition endogenously, competitive search equilibrium achieves
eﬃcient search intensity and entry. As suggested above, market makers ef-
fectively choose the terms of trade to ensure that both workers and ﬁrms
behave optimally. There is nothing special about endogenous entry deci-
sions or search intensity. We could consider various other extensions (e.g.,
match-speciﬁc productivity with the reservation match value yR determined
endogenously), and we would ﬁnd the same thing: bargaining equilibrium is
eﬃcient iﬀ the Hosios condition holds, and competitive search equilibrium
generates this condition endogenously. Rather than go through these exer-
cises we now move to dynamics.
8.2 A Dynamic Model
Here we formulate the planner’s problem for the benchmark Pissarides model
recursively. The state variable is the measure of matched workers, or the
employment rate, e.T h e c u r r e n t p a y o ﬀ is y for each of the e employed
workers, b for each of the 1 − e unemployed workers, and −k for each of
the v =( 1− e)/q vacancies. The employment rate follows a law of motion
45˙ e =
αe(q)
















One can easily show that Y (e) is aﬃne; i.e., we have Y (e)=a0 + a1e for
some constants a0 and a1.43 These constants have useful interpretations: a0
is the value to the planner of an unemployed worker, and a1 the added value
having a worker matched, or the surplus from a match.
The ﬁrst order condition from (104) simpliﬁes to
k = a1 [αe(q) − qα
0
e(q)]. (105)
N o wu s et h ef a c tt h a tY (e)=a0 +a1e and the envelope theorem to diﬀeren-
tiate both sides of (104):










Combining (105) and (106) to eliminate a1, we arrive at








This completely characterizes the optimal policy q = q(e);n o t i c et h a ti nf a c t
q does not depend on the state e, only on exogenous parameters.
How does this compare with equilibrium? Recall that equilibrium in the
bargaining model of Section 4.3 satisﬁes (39). It is easy to see that the
solutions are the same, and hence bargaining equilibrium coincides with the
planner’s solution, iﬀ t h eH o s i o sc o n d i t i o nh o l d s ,θ = ε(q).N o wl o o k i n ga t
(63) from the competitive search version of the model, we see that competitive
search equilibrium is necessarily eﬃcient. Hence the results from the static
model generalize directly. Again, for bargaining to be eﬃcient the Hosios
condition must hold, since otherwise agents are not getting the share of the
surplus that generates eﬃcient behavior, while with competitive search the
agents who post the terms of trade internalize this behavior, and an eﬃcient
division of the surplus emerges endogenously.
43The mapping deﬁned by (104) is a contraction and takes aﬃne functions into aﬃne
functions. Since the set of such functions is closed, the result follows immediately. This
method also works and is especially useful when there is a distribution of productivity
across matches.
468.3 Discussion
We have demonstrated in several contexts that competitive search is eﬃcient,
while bargaining is eﬃcient iﬀ the Hosios condition holds. Although these
results are in some sense general, it would be misleading to suggest that we
can get eﬃcient equilibria in all search models. A very general understanding
of the nature of eﬃciency in these models is still being developed. Mortensen-
Wright (2002) discuss some results for related models, but only for constant
returns matching functions; with increasing returns, equilibria are unlikely
to be eﬃcient. Also, Shimer-Smith (2001) show that in some models with
heterogeneity, even with constant returns, the eﬃcient outcome may not be
a steady state but a cycle.44
The eﬃciency of search equilibria with ex ante investments is an interest-
ing topic. For example, in Masters (1998), agents decide on how much capital
to acquire prior to searching.45 Generically there is no θ that makes the equi-
librium outcome under bargaining eﬃcient–the value of θ that provides the
right incentive for investment in human capital by workers is diﬀerent from
the value of that provides the right incentive for ﬁrms (whether ﬁrms choose
the number of vacancies, the types of jobs to create, or physical capital).
However, Acemoglu-Shimer (1999) show competitive search equilibrium with
e xa n t ei n v e s t m e n t si se ﬃcient. Another case where there is no θ such that
bargaining yields the eﬃcient outcome is discussed by Smith (1999), who
assumes ﬁrms have concave production functions and hire a large number of
workers, but bargain with each one individually. Could competitive search
correct this?
One can also ask about the eﬃciency of the wage-posting models in Sec-
tion 7. In general, if ﬁr m sc o m m i tt op a yt h es a m ew no matter the circum-
stances, it is unlikely to yield eﬃcient outcomes. In the Albrecht-Axel model,
e.g., a planner would want all meetings to result in matches, but this does
not happen. In the basic Burdett-Mortensen model, on the other hand, eﬃ-
ciency does result because all meetings involving unemployed workers result
in matches and other meetings are irrelevant from the planner’s perspec-
44The intuition is simple: when the pool of unmatched agents contains mostly high
productivity types, it is eﬃcient for agents to be demanding and hold out for a high
productivity partner. However, as the pool becomes depleted, they should lower their
standards. By lowering their standards they reduce the fraction of low productivity types
i nt h ep o o l ,a n dw ea r eb a c kt ow h e r ew es t a r t e d .
45See also Acemoglu (1996), Burdett-Smith (2001), Coles-Masters (2000), and Laing-
Palivos-Wang (1995, 2003) for other models with human capital.
47tive since productivity is the same. Finally, nontransferable utility models
typically deliver equilibria that are ineﬃcient. Are there institutions that
correct these ineﬃciencies? These are examples of interesting open questions
in search theory.
9C o n c l u s i o n
We have reviewed various search-based model of the labor market. In con-
trast to standard supply-and-demand models, search theory emphasizes the
frictions inherent in the exchange process, and this leads to many novel in-
sights. There is no single canonical search model, and we have discussed
versions that diﬀer along many dimensions, including wage determination,
the meeting process, and so on. The speciﬁcation that is best suited for a
particular application depends on the issues at hand. At the same time, it
should be clear that there is a common framework underlying all of these
speciﬁcations, and there are several phenomena that can be analyzed natu-
rally in all the various models, such as wage dispersion and turnover. We
have only scratched the surface. But hopefully, this essay will at least convey
the basic ideas in search theory and stimulate additional research.
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